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CONDITION NUMBERS OF STOCHASTIC MEAN PAYOFF GAMES AND
WHAT THEY SAY ABOUT NONARCHIMEDEAN SEMIDEFINITE
PROGRAMMING
XAVIER ALLAMIGEON, STE´PHANE GAUBERT, RICARDO D. KATZ, AND MATEUSZ SKOMRA
Abstract. Semidefinite programming can be considered over any real closed field, including
fields of Puiseux series equipped with their nonarchimedean valuation. Nonarchimedean semi-
definite programs encode parametric families of classical semidefinite programs, for sufficiently
large values of the parameter. Recently, a correspondence has been established between nonar-
chimedean semidefinite programs and stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information.
This correspondence relies on tropical geometry. It allows one to solve generic nonarchimedean
semidefinite feasibility problems, of large scale, by means of stochastic game algorithms. In this
paper, we show that the mean payoff of these games can be interpreted as a condition number
for the corresponding nonarchimedean feasibility problems. This number measures how close
a feasible instance is from being infeasible, and vice versa. We show that it coincides with
the maximal radius of a ball in Hilbert’s projective metric, that is included in the feasible set.
The geometric interpretation of the condition number relies in particular on a duality theorem
for tropical semidefinite feasibility programs. Then, we bound the complexity of the feasibility
problem in terms of the condition number. We finally give explicit bounds for this condition
number, in terms of the characteristics of the stochastic game. As a consequence, we show that
the simplest algorithm to decide whether a stochastic mean payoff game is winning, namely
value iteration, has a pseudopolynomial complexity when the number of random positions is
fixed.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation. Semidefinite programming (SDP) consists in optimizing a linear function
over a spectrahedron, the latter being the intersection of a cone of positive semidefinite matrices
with an affine space. Semidefinite programs arise in a number of applications from engineering
sciences and combinatorial optimization. We refer the reader to [BPT13, GM12] for more
background on the theory and applications of semidefinite programming.
Spectrahedra form a class of convex semialgebraic sets. Even though these sets are usually
defined over the field of real numbers, their definition is meaningful over any real closed field.
In particular, the complexity of SDP and related questions can be investigated over real closed
nonarchimedean fields, like fields of Puiseux series. Such nonarchimedean SDP instances, which
arise in perturbation theory, encode parametric families of classical SDP instances (over the
reals), for large enough (or small enough) values of the parameter. The study of the nonar-
chimedean case is also motivated by unsettled questions concerning the complexity of ordinary
SDP. Indeed, the latter are solvable in “polynomial time” only in a restricted sense. More
precisely, complexity bounds for SDP, obtained by the ellipsoid or interior point methods, are
only polynomial in the log of certain metric estimates whose bit-size can be doubly exponential
in the size of the input [dKV16]. It is unknown whether the SDP feasibility problem belongs to
NP.
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Semidefinite feasibility problems over the nonarchimedean valued field of Puiseux series have
been studied in [AGS18]. It is shown there that, under a genericity condition, these problems
are equivalent to solving stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information and finite
state and action spaces. Stochastic mean payoff games have an unsettled complexity: they
belong to NP ∩ coNP but no polynomial time algorithm is currently known [Con92, AM09].
However, several practically efficient algorithms to solve stochastic mean payoff games have been
developed. In this way, one can solve nonarchimedean semidefinite instances of a scale probably
unreachable by interior point methods. For instance, the benchmarks presented in [AGS18]
show that random instances of these problems with as many as 10000 variables could be solved
by value iteration in a few seconds. Hard instances are experimentally concentrated in a small
“phase transition” region of the parameter space.
1.2. Main results. In order to explain why value iteration is so efficient on many nonar-
chimedean SDP instances, we introduce here a notion of condition number for stochastic mean
payoff games. Essentially, for a feasible instance, the condition number is the inverse of the dis-
tance of the data to an infeasible instance, and vice versa. We show that this condition number
coincides with the absolute value of the mean payoff. We establish a universal bound for the
time of convergence of value iteration, involving the condition number and an auxiliary metric
estimate, the distance of point 0 to the set of “bias vectors” (Theorem 18). Then, we effectively
bound the condition number and the latter distance, for stochastic mean payoff games with
perfect information (Theorems 20 and 21). We arrive, in particular, at a bound that becomes
pseudopolynomial when the number of “random” positions of the game is fixed.
To arrive at these results, we develop a metric geometry approach of the condition number.
We use Hilbert’s projective metric, which arises in Perron–Frobenius theory [Nus88]. The same
metric, up to a logarithmic change of variable, arises in tropical geometry [CGQ04, AGG12].
We also prove duality results for stochastic mean payoff games, showing, essentially, that the
condition number of the primal and dual problems coincide. In summary, our main results show
that the complexity of value iteration is governed by metric geometry properties: this leads to a
general method to derive complexity bounds, which can be applied to various classes of Shapley
operators.
1.3. Related works. When specialized to stochastic mean payoff games with perfect infor-
mation, our bounds should be compared with the one of Boros, Elbassioni, Gurvich, and
Makino [BEGM15]. The authors of [BEGM15] generalize the “pumping” algorithm, devel-
oped for deterministic games by Gurvich, Karzanov, and Khachiyan [GKK88], to the case of
stochastic games. The resulting algorithm is also pseudopolynomial if the number of random
positions is fixed. The algorithm of Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [IJM12] yields a stronger bound
in the case of simple stochastic games, still assuming that the number of random positions is
fixed.
The duality results in Section 4.1 extend to stochastic games some duality results for deter-
ministic games by Grigoriev and Podolskii [GP15]. In contrast, our approach builds on [AGG12],
deriving duality results from a minimax Collatz–Wielandt type theorem of Nussbaum [Nus86].
Other duality results, by Bodirsky and Mamino, in the context of satisfiability problems, have
appeared in [BM16].
1.4. Organization of the paper. Earlier results on the relation between nonarchimedean
semidefinite programming and stochastic mean payoff games are presented in Section 2, leading
to the introduction of the notion of condition number. Some background on nonlinear Perron–
Frobenius theory is presented in Section 3. The new results are included in Section 4, in which
we characterize the condition number, and in Section 5, in which we derive complexity estimates
for value iteration in terms of the condition number. This is a preliminary announcement of
the results. The proofs will appear in a subsequent version.
2
2. Motivation: the correspondence between nonarchimedean semidefinite
programming and stochastic mean payoff games
In this section, we summarize some of the main results of [AGS18], which motivate the present
work. Throughout this paper, given k ∈ N, we denote the set {1, . . . , k} by [k].
2.1. Nonarchimedean semidefinite programs. We start by introducing semidefinite pro-
gramming over nonarchimedean fields. More specifically, the model of nonarchimedean field
used in this paper is the field K of (absolutely convergent generalized real) Puiseux series, which
are series in the parameter t of the form
(1) x =
∞∑
i=1
cλit
λi ,
where (i) (λi)i>1 is a strictly decreasing sequence of real numbers that is either finite or un-
bounded, (ii) cλi ∈ R \ {0} for all λi, (iii) and the series (1) is absolutely convergent for t ∈ R
sufficiently large. There is also a special, empty series, which is denoted by 0. The field K is
ordered, with a total order defined by x > 0 ⇐⇒ cλ1 > 0. In addition, it is known that K is a
real closed field [vdDS98]. Actually, our approach applies to other nonarchimedean fields with a
real value group [AGS16], but it is helpful to have a concrete field in mind, like K. Henceforth,
we denote by K>0 the set of nonnegative series, i.e., the series x that satisfy x = 0 or x > 0.
Given symmetric matrices Q(0),Q(1), . . . ,Q(n) ∈ Km×m, we define the associated spectrahe-
dron (over Puiseux series) as the set
(2)
{
x ∈ Kn : Q(0) + x1Q
(1) + · · ·+ xnQ
(n) is PSD
}
,
where “PSD” stands for positive semidefinite. (We point out that the definition of positive
semidefinite matrices makes sense over any real closed field.) The problem which we are in-
terested in is to determine whether a spectrahedron over Puiseux series is empty or not. This
corresponds to the analog of the semidefinite feasibility problem over the field K. This problem
is also related to the standard semidefinite feasibility problem over the field of real numbers
associated with the spectrahedra
(3)
{
x ∈ Rn : Q(0)(t) + x1Q
(1)(t) + · · ·+ xnQ
(n)(t) is PSD
}
,
for t large enough. Here, Q(i)(t) stands for the real symmetric matrix obtained by evaluating
the entries of Q(i) at the value t. The relation between the problem over Puiseux series and the
one over real numbers is described in the following lemma, and is a consequence of quantifier
elimination over real closed fields:
Lemma 1. The spectrahedron (2) over the field K is empty if and only if, for t sufficiently
large, the spectrahedron (3) over R is empty.
In this paper, we consider a slightly different problem which already retains much of the
difficulty of the semidefinite feasibility problem over the field K: given symmetric matrices
Q(1), . . . ,Q(n) ∈ Km×m, determine whether the following spectrahedral cone
(4)
{
x ∈ Kn>0 : x1Q
(1) + · · ·+ xnQ
(n) is PSD
}
is trivial, meaning that it is reduced to the zero point. We refer to [AGS18] for further details
on the relation between the original semidefinite feasibility problems and the problems above
for spectrahedral cones.
2.2. Valuation map and tropical semifield. As a nonarchimedean field, K is equipped
with a valuation map val : K → R ∪ {−∞} defined by val(x) := λ1 for x 6= 0 as in (1), and
val(0) := −∞. This valuation map has the following properties:
val(x+ y) 6 max(val(x), val(y))(5)
val(xy) = val(x) + val(y) .(6)
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We point out that equality holds in (5) as soon as the leading terms of x and y do not cancel.
In particular, this condition is satisfied when x,y > 0.
The tropical (or max-plus) semifield Tmax can be though of as the image of K>0 by the val-
uation map. More precisely, this semifield is defined as the set Tmax := R ∪ {−∞} endowed
with the addition x ⊕ y := max(x, y) and the multiplication x ⊙ y := x + y. The term “semi-
field” refers to the fact that the addition does not have an opposite law. The reader may
consult [BCOQ92, But10, MS15] for more information on the tropical semifield.
The operations above are extended in the usual way to matrices with entries in Tmax. The
resulting matrix product is also denoted by ⊙. Henceforth, for any z ∈ Tnmax and β ∈ Tmax,
we denote by β + z the vector of Tnmax with entries β + zi. Finally, we denote by 0 the neutral
element for addition in Tmax (i.e., 0 := −∞), as well as any vector that has all components
equal to 0.
We consider Tmax equipped with the topology defined by the distance (a, b) 7→ | exp(a) −
exp(b)|, and Tnmax equipped with the product topology. On R
n we also use Hilbert’s semi-
norm [CGQ04], defined by ‖x‖H := t(x) − b(x), where t(x) := maxi∈[n] xi and b(x) :=
mini∈[n] xi. This seminorm induces a norm on the quotient space of R
n by the tropical par-
allelism relation, which is defined by: x ‖ y if, and only if, there exists α ∈ R such that
x = α + y. We denote by BH(z, r) the Hilbert ball of center z ∈ R
n and radius r ∈ R+, i.e.,
BH(z, r) := {x ∈ R
n : ‖x− z‖H 6 r}. We also endow Tmax with the standard order 6, which is
extended to vectors entrywise.
Another algebraic structure that we will use in this paper is the completed min-plus semiring
Tmin, which is the set R ∪ {+∞} ∪ {−∞} equipped with (a, b) 7→ min{a, b} as addition and
(a, b) 7→ a+ b as multiplication (with the convention (−∞)+ (+∞) = (+∞)+ (−∞) = (+∞)).
The corresponding matrix product for matrices with entries in Tmin will be denoted by ⊙
′.
Given A ∈ Tm×nmax , the operator A
♯ : T
m
min 7→ T
n
min is defined by:
A♯(y) := (−A⊤)⊙′ y ,
where A⊤ denotes the transpose of A. The operator A♯ will be called the adjoint of A, being
an adjoint in a categorical sense as it satisfies the following property:
(7) A⊙ x 6 y if and only if x 6 A♯(y) ,
for any y ∈ T
m
min and x ∈ T
n
max.
2.3. Stochastic zero-sum games with mean payoff. A stochastic mean payoff game can be
specified by two matrices A ∈ Tm×nmax and B ∈ T
m×q
max , and a row-stochastic matrix P ∈ [0, 1]q×n,
where m,n, q > 1. The rules of the game are as follows. Two players, called Max and Min,
control disjoint sets of states, respectively indexed by [m] and [n], and alternatively move a
pawn over these states. When the pawn is located on a state j ∈ [n] of Player Min, she selects
a state i ∈ [m] such that Aij 6= −∞, moves the pawn to state i and pays to Player Max the
amount −Aij. When the pawn is on a state i ∈ [m] of Player Max, he selects a state k ∈ [q]
such that Bik 6= −∞, moves the pawn to state k and receives from Player Min the payment
Bik. Finally, at state k the pawn is moved by nature to state l ∈ [n] with probability Pkl.
We shall make the following finiteness assumption, which assures that players Max and Min
have at least one move available in each state.
Assumption 1. Every row of B has at least one finite entry, and the same is true for every
column of A.
A (positional) strategy for Player Min is a function σ : [n] → [m] such that Aσ(j)j 6= −∞
for all j. Similarly, a (positional) strategy for Player Max is a function τ : [m] → [q] such that
Biτ(i) 6= −∞ for all i. If Min and Max play according to the strategies σ and τ , and start from
state j0 ∈ [n], the movement of the pawn is described by a Markov chain over the disjoint union
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[m] ⊎ [n] ⊎ [q]. Then, the payoff (of Player Max) is defined as the average payoff
gj0(σ, τ) := lim
N→+∞
Eστ
( 1
N
N∑
p=1
(−Aipjp +Bipkp)
)
,
where Eστ refers to the expectation over the trajectories j0, i0, k0, j1, i1, k1, . . . , with respect
to the probability measure determined by these strategies. The objective of Players Min and
Max is to find a strategy which respectively minimizes and maximizes the payoff. Liggett and
Lippman [LL69] showed that there exists a pair of optimal strategies (σ∗, τ∗), which satisfies
gj(σ
∗, τ) 6 gj(σ
∗, τ∗) 6 gj(σ, τ
∗) ,
for every initial state j ∈ [n] and pair of Min/Max strategies (σ, τ). In this case, the quantity
gj(σ
∗, τ∗) is referred to as the value of the game when starting from state j. The state j is
said to be winning (for Player Max) when the associated value is nonnegative. It is said to
be strictly winning for the same player if the associated value is positive. A dual terminology
applies to Player Min.
With any such a game is associated a Shapley operator, which is the map F : Tnmax → T
n
max
defined by
F = A♯ ◦B ◦ P ,(8)
i.e., F (x) = A♯(B ⊙ (Px)), where Px denotes the usual matrix-vector product of P and x.
The finiteness assumption (Assumption 1) on the entries of the matrices A,B imply that F
preserves both Tnmax and R
n. It is convenient to consider the vector vk := F k(0), for k ∈ N,
where F k = F ◦ · · · ◦ F denotes the kth iterate of F . The jth entry vkj represents the value of
the game in finite horizon k with initial state j, associated with the same data. The vector
χ(F ) := lim
k→∞
vk/k = lim
k→∞
F k(0)/k
is known as the escape rate vector of F . We shall recall in Section 3 why this escape rate exists.
It is known that
gj(σ
∗, τ∗) = χj(F ) ,(9)
i.e., the value of the mean payoff game coincides with the limit of the mean value per time unit
of the finite horizon game, as the horizon tends to infinity. In this way, solving a mean payoff
games reduces to a dynamical systems issue: computing the escape rate vector of a Shapley
operator.
Mean payoff games can be defined in different guises: this only changes the explicit form
of the Shapley operator, without impact on the complexity of the problem, as shown by the
following remark.
Remark 2. Here, we assumed that Players Min, Max, and nature, play successively, in this
order. Starting with Player Max, instead of Min, while keeping the same circular order, would
result in replacing the Shapley operator F by its cyclic conjugate
F cyc(y) = B ⊙ (P (A♯(y)))(10)
defined on Tmmax. If the order was changed in a non cyclic way, nature playing for instance after
Min and before Max, then, the original Shapley operator F would be replaced by:
F¯ (x) = A¯♯(P¯ (B¯ ⊙ x))(11)
for some matrices A¯ ∈ Tq×nmax, P¯ ∈ [0, 1]q×m, and B¯ ∈ Tm×nmax . It is also convenient to consider the
effect of Players Max and Min swapping their roles in the original game. This would amount
to replacing F by:
F˜ (x) = −F (−x) = A⊤ ⊙ ((B⊤)♯(Px)) ,(12)
recalling that ·⊤ denotes the transposition. Observe that χ(F˜ ) = −χ(F ). Moreover, if F can
be factored as G ◦ H, G and H being any compositions of maps of the form A♯, y 7→ B ⊙ y,
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or z 7→ Pz, it can be shown that χ(F ) = Gˆ(χ(H ◦ G)) where Gˆ(x) := lims→∞ s
−1G(sx) is
the recession function of G, whose evaluation is straightforward. Hence, one can recover the
escape rate vector of G ◦H from the escape rate vector of its cyclic conjugate H ◦G, and vice
versa. Therefore, for an operator given in any of the forms (8) and (10)–(12), the complexity
of computing the escape rate is independent of the choice of the special form.
2.4. Zero-sum games associated with nonarchimedean semidefinite programs. The
correspondence between semidefinite feasibility problems for spectrahedral cones and stochastic
mean payoff games is given in the next theorem:
Theorem 3. With every spectrahedral cone C of the form (4) is associated a stochastic mean
payoff game that satisfies the following property: if the valuation of the entries of the matrices
Q(i) are chosen in a generic way, then C is nontrivial if and only if at least one state in the
associated game is winning.
This correspondence is established in [AGS18] by considering the following problem:
P(F ) : does there exist x ∈ Tnmax such that x 6= 0 and x 6 F (x)?
where F : Tnmax → T
n
max is the Shapley operator of the game associated with the spectrahedral
cone C. This problem is said to be feasible when it admits a solution, and infeasible otherwise.
We point out that P(F ) is feasible if, and only if, the associated stochastic mean payoff game
has a winning state. Equivalently, this amounts to the fact that the set
(13) S(F ) := {x ∈ Tnmax : x 6 F (x)}
is nontrivial, meaning that it is not reduced to the point 0.
The correspondence between nonarchimedean semidefinite programming and stochastic games
is simpler to present if we assume that the matrices Q(1), . . . ,Q(n) are (negated) Metzler matri-
ces, which means that their off-diagonal entries are nonpositive. In this case, if the genericity
assumption of Theorem 3 is satisfied, S(F ) is precisely the image under the valuation map of
C. Similarly, we can consider the problem:
PR(F ) : does there exist x ∈ R
n such that x≪ F (x)?
where y ≪ z stands for the fact that yi < zi for all i. This problem is feasible if, and only if,
the set S(F ) is strictly nontrivial, meaning that there exists x ∈ Rn such that x≪ F (x). This
corresponds to the property where every state of the game has a positive value.
The Shapley operator and the associated feasibility problems P(F ) and PR(F ) provide
further conditions under which game algorithms are directly applicable to solve nonarchimedean
feasibility problems, disregarding the genericity conditions of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. For any Metzler matrices Q(1), . . . ,Q(n), we have:
(i) if P(F ) is infeasible, or equivalently, S(F ) is trivial, then C is trivial.
(ii) if PR(F ) is feasible, or equivalently, S(F ) is strictly nontrivial, then C is strictly non-
trivial, meaning that there exists x ∈ Kn>0 such that the matrix x1Q
(1) + · · · + xnQ
(n) is
positive definite.
Following the analogy with the classical condition number in linear programming (see, e.g.,
[Ren95]), we are interested in finding a numerical quantity measuring (the inverse of) the dis-
tance to triviality when the instance is nontrivial or to nontriviality when it is trivial. In more
details, we define the condition number cond(F ) of the above problem P(F ) by:
(14) (inf{‖u‖∞ : u ∈ R
n , P(u+ F ) is infeasible})−1
if P(F ) is feasible, and
(15) (inf{‖u‖∞ : u ∈ R
n , P(u+ F ) is feasible})−1
if P(F ) is infeasible (with the convention 0−1 = +∞). Here, u + F stands for the map
x 7→ u+F (x), where the addition is understood entrywise, and ‖ · ‖∞ stands for the sup-norm,
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i.e., ‖u‖∞ := maxi |ui|. The condition number condR(F ) of the problem PR(F ) is defined in
the same way as in (14) and (15) but replacing P by PR.
Remark 5. Looking for additive perturbations of the form u+ F is a canonical approach; such
perturbations have been already used to reveal the ergodicity properties of the game [AGH15].
This is also the finite dimensional analogue of perturbing the Hamiltonian of a Hamilton–Jacobi
PDE by adding a potential [FR13].
Remark 6. In [AGS18], the Shapley operator associated with a nonarchimedean SDP feasibility
problem is written as A♯◦P ◦B instead of A♯◦B◦P . As there are reductions between the games
corresponding to both forms (as discussed in Remark 2), we consider here a Shapley operator
in the latter form. This is more suitable to state the complexity estimates in Section 5.
3. Preliminary results of nonlinear Perron–Frobenius theory
In this section, we recall some elements of nonlinear Perron–Frobenius theory which will be
used to study the condition numbers introduced above. To do so, we next axiomatize essential
properties of the Shapley operators considered in Section 2.3, following the “operator approach”
of stochastic games [RS01, Ney03].
A self-map F of Tnmax is said to be order-preserving when
x 6 y =⇒ F (x) 6 F (y) for all x, y ∈ Tnmax ,
and additively homogeneous when
F (λ+ x) = λ+ F (x) for all λ ∈ Tmax and x ∈ T
n
max .
We point out that any order-preserving and additively homogeneous self-map F of Tnmax that
preserves Rn is nonexpansive in the sup-norm, meaning that
‖F (x) − F (y)‖∞ 6 ‖x− y‖∞ for all x, y ∈ R
n .
Given an order-preserving and additively homogeneous self-map F of Tnmax, the vectors x ∈
T
n
max satisfying x 6 F (x) can be thought of as the nonlinear analogues of subharmonic functions.
A central role in determining the existence of such vectors is played by the limit χ(F ) =
limk→∞(F
k(x)/k), for x ∈ Rn. When this limit exists, it can be shown to be independent of
the choice of x ∈ Rn, and so it coincides with the escape rate vector χ(F ) of F . The following
theorem of Kohlberg implies that the limit does exist when F preserves Rn and its restriction
to Rn is piecewise affine (meaning that Rn can be covered by finitely many polyhedra such that
F restricted to any of them is affine).
Theorem 7. [Koh80] A piecewise affine self-map F of Rn that is nonexpansive in any norm
admits an invariant half-line, meaning that there exist z, w ∈ Rn such that
F (z + βw) = z + (β + 1)w
for any β ∈ R large enough. In particular, the escape rate vector χ(F ) exists, and is given by
the vector w.
Kohlberg’s theorem applies to Shapley operators of stochastic mean payoff games with finite
state and action spaces and perfect information. Indeed, the Shapley operator (8) of the game
described in Section 2.3 is order-preserving and additively homogeneous, and its restriction to
R
n is piecewise affine.
For a general order-preserving and additively homogeneous self-map of Tnmax, the escape rate
vector may not exist. We can still, however, recover information about the sequences (F k(x)/k)k
through the Collatz–Wielandt numbers of F . Assuming that F is a continuous, order-preserving,
and additively homogeneous self-map F of Tnmax, we define the upper Collatz–Wielandt number
of F by:
(16) cw(F ) := inf{µ ∈ R : ∃z ∈ Rn, F (z) 6 µ+ z} ,
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and the lower Collatz–Wielandt number of F by:
(17) cw(F ) := sup{µ ∈ R : ∃z ∈ Rn, F (z) > µ+ z} .
A relation between the escape rate vector and the upper Collatz–Wielandt number is given in
the next theorem, which is derived in [AGG12] from a minimax result of Nussbaum [Nus86].
Theorem 8. [AGG12, Lemma 2.8] Let F be a continuous, order-preserving, and additively
homogeneous self-map of Tnmax. Then,
lim
k→∞
t(F k(x)/k) = cw(F ) = sup{µ ∈ Tmax : ∃z ∈ T
n
max, z 6= 0, F (z) > µ+ z}
for any x ∈ Rn.
It is known that an order-preserving and additively homogeneous self-map of Rn admits a
unique continuous extension to Tnmax, see [BNS03]. Then, as noted in [AGG12, Remark 2.10],
the previous result can be dualized when F preserves Rn.
Corollary 9. Let F be a continuous, order-preserving, and additively homogeneous self-map of
T
n
max that preserves R
n. Then,
lim
k→∞
b(F k(x)/k) = cw(F )
for any x ∈ Rn.
As a consequence, when the escape rate vector exists, we simply have
cw(F ) = t(χ(F )) and cw(F ) = b(χ(F )) .
Specializing this to the case where F is the Shapley operator of a game, the quantities cw(F )
and cw(F ) respectively correspond to the greatest and smallest values of the states for the mean
payoff problem.
In the sequel, we will consider especially the situation in which there is a vector v ∈ Rn and
a scalar λ ∈ R such that
F (v) = λ+ v .(18)
The scalar λ, which is unique, is known as the ergodic constant, and (18) is referred to as the
ergodic equation. We will denote this scalar by ρ(F ) as it is a nonlinear extension of the spectral
radius. The vector v is known as a bias, or a potential. It is easily seen that if F admits such a
bias vector, then
cw(F ) = cw(F ) = ρ(F ) ,
and the condition that ρ(F ) > 0 means that the game is winning for every initial state. The
existence of a bias vector is guaranteed by certain “ergodicity” assumptions [AGH15].
4. Metric geometry properties of condition numbers
4.1. Condition numbers vs Collatz–Wielandt numbers, and duality. We point out
that the definitions given in Section 2.4 of the condition numbers cond(F ) and condR(F ) can
be generalized to any continuous, order-preserving, and additively homogeneous self-map F of
T
n
max. The next proposition provides a characterization of these condition numbers in terms of
the Collatz–Wielandt numbers of F .
Proposition 10. Let F be a continuous, order-preserving, and additively homogeneous self-map
of Tnmax. Then,
condR(F ) = |cw(F )|
−1 and cond(F ) = |cw(F )|−1.
We define the dual of the mean payoff game of Section 2.4 as the one whose Shapley operator
is F ∗ = (B⊤)♯ ◦P ◦A⊤. The following theorem will allow us to relate PR(F ) with PR(F
∗) and
P(F ∗).
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Theorem 11 (Duality theorem). Let F = A♯◦B◦P and F ∗ = (B⊤)♯◦P ◦A⊤, where A ∈ Tm×nmax
and B ∈ Tm×qmax satisfy Assumption 1, A has at least one finite entry per row, and P ∈ Rq×n is
a row-stochastic matrix. Then,
cw(F ∗) = −cw(F ) .
As a consequence of Theorem 11, we obtain:
Corollary 12. Let F = A♯ ◦B ◦ P and F ∗ = (B⊤)♯ ◦ P ◦A⊤, where A ∈ Tm×nmax and B ∈ T
m×q
max
satisfy Assumption 1, A has at least one finite entry per row, and P ∈ Rq×n is a row-stochastic
matrix. Then,
(i) The condition number of PR(F ) coincides with the condition number of P(F
∗).
(ii) Either P(F ∗) is feasible or PR(F ) is feasible.
(iii) Only one of the problems PR(F ) and PR(F
∗) can be feasible.
4.2. A geometric characterization of condition numbers. In this section, we study the
inner radius of the feasible sets of games, that is, given the Shapley operator F : Tnmax → T
n
max
of a game, we study the maximal radius of a Hilbert ball contained in the set (13).
We start with the following simple lemma.
Lemma 13. Let F be an order-preserving and additively homogeneous self-map of Tnmax. As-
sume z ∈ Rn and r ∈ R+ are such that r 6 b(F (z) − z). Then, the Hilbert ball BH(z, r) is
contained in S(F ).
For the condition in the previous lemma to be also necessary for the inclusion to hold, we
need an additional assumption on F .
Definition 1. An order-preserving and additively homogeneous self-map F of Tnmax is said to
be diagonal free when Fi(x) is independent of xi for all i ∈ [n]. In other words, F is diagonal
free if for all i ∈ [n], and for all x, y ∈ Rn such that xj = yj for j 6= i, we have Fi(x) = Fi(y).
Lemma 14. When F is diagonal free, for any z ∈ Rn and r ∈ R+ the Hilbert ball BH(z, r) is
contained in S(F ) only if r 6 b(F (z)− z).
If F is not diagonal free, the conclusion of Lemma 14 does not necessarily hold, as shown in
the next example.
Example 15. Let us consider the order-preserving and additively homogeneous map F = A♯ ◦B,
where A =
(
0 0 0
)
and B =
(
−1 0 −1
)
. Then, for z =
(
0 3 0
)⊤
, it can be verified that
BH(z, 3) ⊂ S(F ) =
{
x ∈ R3 : x 6 A♯ ◦B(x)
}
=
{
x ∈ R3 : A⊙ x 6 B ⊙ x
}
. However, we have
F (x) =


max{x1 − 1, x2, x3 − 1}
max{x1 − 1, x2, x3 − 1}
max{x1 − 1, x2, x3 − 1}

 ,
and so b(F (z) − z) = 0.
As a consequence of Lemmas 13 and 14, we obtain:
Theorem 16. Let F be a diagonal free self-map of Tnmax. Then, S(F ) contains a Hilbert ball
of positive radius if and only if cw(F ) > 0. Moreover, when S(F ) contains a Hilbert ball of
positive radius, the supremum of the radii of the Hilbert balls contained in S(F ) coincides with
cw(F ).
Sergeev established in [Ser07] a characterization of the inner radius of polytropes, which
corresponds to the special case of Theorem 16 in which F is the Shapley operator of a game
with only one player and deterministic transitions.
Remark 17. The condition in Theorem 16 is not too restrictive. Indeed, it can be shown that
in most cases of interest, if the Shapley operator F of a mean payoff game is not diagonal free,
one can construct another mean payoff game such that its Shapley operator is diagonal free and
the inner radius of its feasible set coincides with the one of S(F ).
9
1: procedure ValueIteration(F )
2: ⊲ F a Shapley operator from Rn to Rn
3: ⊲ The algorithm will report whether Player Max or Player Min wins the mean payoff game repre-
sented by F
4: u := 0 ∈ Rn
5: while t(u) > 0 and b(u) < 0 do u := F (u) ⊲ At iteration ℓ, u = F ℓ(0) is the value vector of
the game in finite horizon ℓ
6: done
7: if t(u) < 0 then return “Player Min wins”
8: else return “Player Max wins”
9: end
10: end
Figure 1. Basic value iteration algorithm.
5. Bounding the complexity of value iteration by the condition numbers
In this section, F is an order-preserving and additively homogeneous self-map of Tnmax which
preserves Rn. We also assume that F admits a bias vector v ∈ Rn, as in (18).
5.1. A universal complexity bound for value iteration. The most straightforward idea
to solve a mean payoff game is probably value iteration: we infer whether or not the mean
payoff game is winning by solving the finite horizon game, for a large enough horizon. This is
formalized in Fig. 1.
We next show, in Theorem 18, that this value iteration algorithm terminates and is correct,
provided the mean payoff of the game is nonzero (i.e., ρ(F ) 6= 0), and the operations are
performed in exact arithmetic. We shall see in Corollaries 25 and 26 that these two restrictions
can be eliminated, at the price of an increase of the complexity bound.
It is convenient to introduce the following metric estimate, which represents the minimal
Hilbert’s seminorm of a bias vector
R(F ) := inf {‖u‖H : u ∈ R
n, F (u) = ρ(F ) + u} .
Since F is assumed to have a bias vector v ∈ Rn, we have R(F ) 6 ‖v‖H < ∞ and ρ(F ) =
cw(F ) = cw(F ). Hence, by Proposition 10,
|ρ(F )|−1 = |cw(F )|−1 = |cw(F )|−1 = condR(F ) = cond(F ) .
We shall denote by cond(F ) this common quantity.
Note that |ρ(F )| has a remarkable interpretation, as the value of an auxiliary game, in which
there is an initial stage, at which Player Max can decide either to keep his role or to swap
it with the role of Player Min. Then, the two players play the mean payoff game as usual.
Swapping roles amounts to replacing F by the Shapley operator F˜ (x) := −F (−x). Observe
also that ρ(F˜ ) = −ρ(F ) as noted in Remark 2. Hence, the value of this modified game is
precisely max(ρ(F ), ρ(F˜ )) = |ρ(F )|.
The following result bounds the complexity of value iteration in terms of R(F ) and of the
condition number cond(F ).
Theorem 18. Suppose that the Shapley operator F has a bias vector and that the ergodic
constant ρ(F ) is nonzero. Then, procedure ValueIteration terminates after
Nvi 6 R(F ) cond(F )
iterations and returns the correct answer.
5.2. Bounding the condition number and the bias vector of a stochastic mean payoff
game. We next bound the condition number |ρ(F )|−1, and the metric estimate R(F ), when F
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is a Shapley operator of a stochastic game with perfect information and finite action spaces. As
in Section 2.3, we assume that
F = A♯ ◦B ◦ P(19)
where A ∈ Tm×nmax has at least one finite entry per column, B ∈ T
m×q
max has at least one finite
entry per row, and P ∈ Rq×n is a row-stochastic matrix. To obtain explicit bounds, we will
assume that the finite entries of the matrices A and B are integers, and we set
W := max {|Aij −Bih| : Aij 6= 0, Bih 6= 0, i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], h ∈ [q]} .
This is not more special than assuming that the finite entries of A and B are rational numbers
(we may always rescale rational payments so that they become integers). We also assume
that the probabilities Pil are rational, and that they have a common denominator M ∈ N>0,
Pil = Qil/M , where Qil ∈ [M ] for all i ∈ [q] and l ∈ [n].
We say that a state i ∈ [q] is nondeterministic if there are at least two indices l, l′ ∈ [n] such
that Pil > 0 and Pil′ > 0.
The following lemma improves an estimate in [BEGM15].
Lemma 19. Suppose that a Markov chain with n states is irreducible, and that the transition
probabilities are rational numbers whose denominators divide an integer M . Let k 6 n denote
the number of states with at least 2 possible successors. Let π ∈ (0, 1]n×n denote the invariant
measure of the chain. Then, the least common denominator of the rational numbers (πi)i∈n is
not greater than nMmin{k,n−1}.
We deduce the following result.
Theorem 20. Let F be a Shapley operator as above, still supposing that F has a bias vector
and that ρ(F ) is nonzero. If k is the number of nondeterministic states of the game, then
cond(F ) 6 nMmin{k,n−1}.
To bound R(F ), we use the following idea. For 0 < α < 1, let vα denote the value of the
discounted game associated with F , meaning that vα = F (αvα). Since F represents a zero-
sum game with perfect information and finite state and action spaces, it is known that vα
has a Laurent series expansion in powers of (1 − α) with a pole of order at most 1 at α = 1,
see [Koh80]. We can deduce from this that the limit of vα− ρ(F )/(1−α) as α→ 1
− exists and
that it is a bias, which we call the Blackwell bias. By working out the limit, we arrive at the
following estimate.
Theorem 21. Let F be the Shapley operator in (19), still supposing that it has a bias vector,
and let v∗ be its Blackwell bias. Then,
R(F ) 6 ‖v∗‖H 6 10n
2WMmin{k,n−1} .
By combining Theorems 20 and 21, we arrive at the following.
Corollary 22. Let F be the Shapley operator in (19), still supposing that it has a bias vector
and that ρ(F ) is nonzero. Then, procedure ValueIteration stops after
Nvi 6 10n
3WM2min{k,n−1}(20)
iterations and correctly decides which of the two players is winning.
We next show that when specialized to deterministic games, the universal estimate of Theo-
rem 18 gives precisely the complexity bound of Zwick–Paterson [ZP96].
Lemma 23. Let F = A♯ ◦ B, where A,B ∈ Tm×nmax , and suppose that there exists v ∈ R
n such
that F (v) = ρ(F ) + v. Then
R(F ) 6 (n− 1)(|ρ(F )| +W ) ,
where W is defined as in (20), setting q = n.
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u := 0 ∈ Rn, ℓ := 0 ∈ N, ǫ ∈ R>0
while ℓǫ+ t(u) > 0 and −ℓǫ+ b(u) 6 0 do
u := F (u); ℓ := ℓ+1 ⊲ The operator F is evaluated in approximate arithmetic, so that F (u) is at
most at distance ǫ in the sup-norm from its true value.
done
if ℓǫ+ t(u) 6 0 then return “Player Min wins”
end
if −ℓǫ+ b(u) > 0 then return “Player Max wins”
end
Figure 2. Modification of the basic value iteration algorithm to work in finite
precision arithmetic.
For deterministic games with integer payments, the mean payoff is given by the average
weight of a circuit, which has length at most n. It follows that |ρ(F )| > 1/n, unless ρ(F ) = 0.
Note also that ρ(F ) 6 W . By applying Theorem 20, we arrive at the following bound for the
number of iterations Nvi of the algorithm in Fig. 1.
Corollary 24 (Compare with [ZP96]). Let F = A♯◦B be the Shapley operator of a deterministic
game, where the finite entries of A,B ∈ Tm×nmax are integers. If there exists v ∈ R
n such that
F (v) = ρ(F ) + v with ρ(F ) 6= 0, then
Nvi 6 2n
2W .
The assumption ρ(F ) 6= 0 that is used in Theorem 18 can be relaxed, by appealing to the
following perturbation and scaling argument. This leads to a bound in which the exponents of
M and of n are increased.
Corollary 25. Let µ := nMmin{k,n−1}. Then, procedure ValueIteration, applied to the
perturbed and rescaled Shapley operator 1 + 2µF , satisfies
Nvi 6 21n
4WM3min{k,n−1}
iterations, and this holds unconditionally. If the algorithm reports that Max wins, then Max is
winning in the original mean payoff game. If the algorithm reports that Min wins, then Min is
strictly winning in the original mean payoff game.
The algorithm in Fig. 1 can be adapted to work in finite precision arithmetic. Consider the
variant of the main body of this algorithm, given in Fig. 2. We assume that each evaluation of
the Shapley operator F is performed with an error of at most ǫ > 0 in the sup-norm.
Corollary 26. Let F be the Shapley operator in (19), still supposing that it has a bias vector
and that ρ(F ) is nonzero. Let µ := nMmin{k,n−1}. Then, for any 0 < ǫ 6 µ−1/3, value iteration
performed with a numerical precision of ǫ at each step (i.e., the algorithm in Fig. 2) stops after
Nvi 6 30n
3WM2min{k,n−1}(21)
iterations and correctly decides which of the two players is winning.
Observe that (21) is the bound (20) multiplied by 3.
6. Concluding remarks
We introduced a notion of condition number for stochastic mean payoff games, and bounded
the complexity of value iteration in terms of this condition number. Whereas condition numbers
are familiar for problems over archimedean fields, this leads to an appropriate notion of condi-
tion number for nonarchimedean semidefinite programming. In particular, our present results
explain, at least in part, the perhaps surprising benchmarks of [AGS18], revealing that random
nonarchimedean semidefinite feasibility instances with generic valuations can be simpler to solve
than their archimedean analogues. In some sense, “good conditioning” provides a quantitative
version of “genericity,” and most instances in [AGS18] are well conditioned. This raises the
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issue of evaluating the condition number on random instances. It is also an interesting question
to investigate whether the solution of nonarchimedean SDP could be used, in general, to solve
archimedean SDP, and vice versa.
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